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Letters

Letters

Robotic Responses • Beware of Derrida • The Myth Of The Myth • Swan And On • Suffering Is Good Shock • Mary Midgley Matters • Defending Dennett

Robotic Responses

DEAR EDITOR: JoelMarks in his article on robotic moral agency asked how we could not ascribe moral agency to a machine that was programmed to act exactly as a moral human would. I would ask, how can we even ascribe agency, let alone morality, to such a device? Surely the relevant agent is the programmer. It’s like being a passenger onWendellWallach’s hypothetical train bearing down on five people and being redirected to kill only one. Obviously the passenger is involved in the incident, in the sense that they are present, but they’re not aware of what is happening and have no control over events. The passenger could hardly be blamed or praised for the results.