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Tallis in Wonderland

Cut-Price Dualism: ‘Properties Not Substances’

Raymond Tallis says a modern modified mind-body dualism still doesn’t work.

According to a recent survey, mind-matter dualism still enjoys significant support among Anglophone philosophers (‘Philosophers on Philosophy’, David Bourget and David Chalmers, Philosophers’ Imprint, 22:11, 2023). While it is less popular than materialism, its 22% rating surprised me. After all, failing to deal with the problems of Cartesian dualism has shaped much of the philosophical conversation since Descartes argued in 1642 that mind and matter were distinct and independent substances.

The most obvious objection – first expressed by Descartes’ pupil Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia – is that the mind (res cogitans) and matter (res extensa) do not seem to have the wherewithal to engage with each other. How could the impact of material events on the body trigger mental events that lack location? And how could mental events without location bring about changes in the material world, as when thoughts lead to actions? By what means is locationless mind associated with a specific body, such that conscious experiences are those of an individual subject inseparable from a particular portion of space-occupying flesh?

It is not, therefore, surprising that a version of materialism, where minds are envisaged as events or processes in the brain, was the preferred choice of more than 50% of philosophers in the survey.