Your complimentary articles

You’ve read all of your complimentary articles for this month. To have complete access to the thousands of philosophy articles on this site, please

If you are a subscriber please sign in to your account.

To buy or renew a subscription please visit Subscriptions.

If you are a print subscriber you can contact us to create an online account.

You can register for a free account to have four complimentary articles per month. We will occasionally email you a newsletter, from which you can unsubscribe at any time. We do not sell personal data or otherwise disclose personal information to other organisations.

Books

Berkeley’s Puzzle by John Campbell & Quassim Cassam

Nick Everitt experiences views on the nature of experiences that don’t yield knowledge.

It seems plausible to say that we have some knowledge of some of the objects in the world around us. I know now, for example, that I am sitting at a table, that the table is roughly rectangular, and that it is a shade of brown. It also seems plausible to say that we have knowledge of this kind because of the sensory experiences we have. These claims seem reassuringly, perhaps even boringly, secure.

These seeming truisms form the basis of a debate between John Campbell, professor of philosophy at Berkeley, who defends a so-called ‘relational’ view of sensory experience, and Quassim Cassam, professor of philosophy at Warwick, who defends a so-called ‘representational’ view.

…